bank capital regulation model by cho, hyejin
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
bank capital regulation model
hyejin cho
paris 1
12. March 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54409/
MPRA Paper No. 54409, posted 14. March 2014 15:52 UTC
1.Motivation
2.Literature
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
4. General Equilibrium
How we can induce the moral hazard problem?
Bank Capital Regulation (BCR) Model
Hye-jin CHO
March 11, 2014
Hye-jin CHO Bank Capital Regulation (BCR) Model
1.Motivation
2.Literature
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
4. General Equilibrium
How we can induce the moral hazard problem?
Table of contents
1.Motivation
2.Literature
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
4. General Equilibrium
Saving preference of Consumers
Borrowing composition of Firms
Demand Deposit of Bank
Federal Reserve Banks and general equilibrium
description about the BCR model
How we can induce the moral hazard problem?
Hye-jin CHO Bank Capital Regulation (BCR) Model
1.Motivation
2.Literature
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
4. General Equilibrium
How we can induce the moral hazard problem?
1.Motivation - Special concerns for financial crisis...
Banking sector: Need to cooperate for the financial stability )
Basel 3, accord by the financial regulation,
1. Raising the quality, consistency and transparency of the capital
base
2. Enhancing risk coverage
3. Supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a
leverage ratio
4. Reducing procyclicality (to the financial shocks) and promoting
countercyclical buffers.
5. Addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness
Hye-jin CHO Bank Capital Regulation (BCR) Model
1.Motivation
2.Literature
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
4. General Equilibrium
How we can induce the moral hazard problem?
2.Literature
Economic approach for capital adequacy regulation
Michaelsen-Goshay (1967), Krouse (1970), Parkin (1970), Haugen
and Kroncke (1970), Pyle (1971), Hart and Jaffee (1974), Kahane
and Nye (1975)
Bank’s problem approach (commercial, reserve bank) Cost of
Deposit Insurance, Merton (1978) Dynamic banking model,
deposit as uncertainty variable, OHARA (1983) Reserve
management modeling, Santomero (1984) Capital regulation on
bank asset portfolio risk, Furlong-Keeley (1989) Financial
intermediaries and Liquidity trader, Gorton-Pennachi (1990)
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2.Literature
Financial Market approach Regulatory capital requirement,
Berger-Herring-Szego (1995) Bank lending and money supply,
Thakor (1996) Bank shareholder value and market risk,
Kupiec-Obrien (1997)
Macruprudential approach One bank model at the bank capital
and risk-taking, Milne-Whalley (1998) Dynamics of variables in the
general equilibrium, Diaz (2005) Procyclicality of Capital
requirement in a general equilibrium and equity issuance cost,
Covas-Fujita (2010) Financial Regulation in General Equilibrium,
Goodhart-Kashrap-Tsomocos (2011) Macroprudential capital
regulation in general equilibrium, Nelson-Pinter (2012)
Hye-jin CHO Bank Capital Regulation (BCR) Model
1.Motivation
2.Literature
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
4. General Equilibrium
How we can induce the moral hazard problem?
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
In the systemic risk, we can measure the risk impacting on other
factors like firms, households and federal reserve banks, not on
commercial banks.
Easily, monetary policy on banking considers the systemic risk.
We need to consider different measures to analyse systemic risk of
banks with domino effects, contagions. Systemic risk of banks
can be explained in the ”static model within the general
equilibrium”. Otherwise, domino effects or contagions should be
described as movements having the future tendency. ”Scope of
regulation” should be detected by categorization of on balance
sheet and off balance sheet factors.
Risks on the balance sheet of bank are divided into credit risk,
market risk, liquidity risk and systemic risk.
Hye-jin CHO Bank Capital Regulation (BCR) Model
1.Motivation
2.Literature
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
4. General Equilibrium
How we can induce the moral hazard problem?
SOE(Structure of Equilibrium) of BOK (Bank of Korea)
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Vanhoose 2008 - Asset/Liability of banks
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Freixas-Rochet (1999)
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Structure of Equilibrium
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Saving preference of Consumers
Borrowing composition of Firms
Demand Deposit of Bank
Federal Reserve Banks and general equilibrium
description about the BCR model
Saving preference of Consumers
The two-period model (t = 0, 1, 2,) with a unique physical good
initially owned by the consumers in the economy in which a
continuum of ex-ante identical agents is each endowed with one
unit of good at period t = 0, and this good is to be consumed at
periods t = 1 and t = 2. The consumer chooses her consumption
profile (C1, C2), and the allocation of her savings S between bank
deposits Dh and securities
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s , in a way that maximize her
utility function u under her budget constraints:
Max u(C1,C2)
C1 +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s + D
h + Sh −
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s − Dh = ω1
C2 = Πf + Πb + (1 + r)
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s + (1 + rD)D
h + (1 + rh)Sh −
(1 + r)
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s
−(1 + rD)Dh
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Saving preference of Consumers
Borrowing composition of Firms
Demand Deposit of Bank
Federal Reserve Banks and general equilibrium
description about the BCR model
Borrowing composition of Firms
The firm chooses its investment level I and its financing (through
real asset Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsBh, liabilities to bank
Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsBh − Lfr (or Liabilities to central bank Lfr ) in a way
that maximizes its profit:
Max Πf (Pf )
Πf =f (I ) + rf (Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s )− rLBank (Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s −
Lfr )− rLfr Lfr
I = Sh=Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s
Where rf is the premium of firm real asset. rLBank , rLfr is the
interest rate on bank loans and federal reserve bank loan. Dh
denotes for bank deposits. Bh denotes for securities. Especially Bfr
denotes for securities of federal reserve banks. Lfr is loan claimed
by the firm to the federal reserve bank.
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Saving preference of Consumers
Borrowing composition of Firms
Demand Deposit of Bank
Federal Reserve Banks and general equilibrium
description about the BCR model
Demand Deposit of Bank
The bank chooses its supply of loans to firms Dh + Bfr − Lfr , its
demand for deposits Dh, and the borrowing Bfr − Lfr in a way that
maximized its profit:
Max Πb (Pb)
Πb = rLBank (Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s −Lfr )−rLf r (
∑
s∈Ω PsB
fr
s −Lfr )−rDDh
Where rLBank , rLfr is the interest rate on bank loans and federal
reserve bank loan. Dh denotes for bank deposits. rD is the interest
rate paid by deposits Bhs denotes for securities. Especially B
fr
s
denotes for securities of federal reserve banks. Lfr is loan claimed
by the firm to the federal reserve bank.
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Saving preference of Consumers
Borrowing composition of Firms
Demand Deposit of Bank
Federal Reserve Banks and general equilibrium
description about the BCR model
Federal Reserve Banks and general equilibrium
The Federal Reserve Banks chooses its investment level I and its
financing (through real asset Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s , liabilities to bank
Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s − Lfr (or Liabilities to central bank Lfr ) in a way
that maximizes its profit:
Max Πf (Pf )
Πf =f (I ) + rf (Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s )− rLBank (Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsBh −
Lfr )− rLfr Lfr
I = Sh
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Saving preference of Consumers
Borrowing composition of Firms
Demand Deposit of Bank
Federal Reserve Banks and general equilibrium
description about the BCR model
description about the BCR model
(result) Arrow (1953) If firms and households have unrestricted
access to perfect financial markets, then at the competitive
equilibrium
(result) Cho (2014) If the sum accumulated variables is not
negative, for example, the components Investment I, Savings Sh,
Lfr are not negative, there is the equilibrium in the economy and
the existence of each factors like firms, Households, Banks, Federal
Reserve Banks is fulfilled. The size of banks is affecting on
each agent because equity capitals depend on previous
deposits. Depending the change of bank size influencing on total
deposit Dh, the liability of firms is affected by liabilities to banks
Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s − Lfr , deposit of household Dh and real asset of
household and firms.
Hye-jin CHO Bank Capital Regulation (BCR) Model
1.Motivation
2.Literature
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
4. General Equilibrium
How we can induce the moral hazard problem?
Autarky concerns
The simplest case, in which there is no trade between agents, is
called ”autarky”.
C1 = 1− I + LI = 1− I (1− L) is equivalent or less than 1
Consumer can liquidate investment I and re-invest LI .
On the contrary, if he has to consume late, he obtains profit R
about Investment I . Hence, he get RI
C2 = 1− I + RI = 1 + I (R − 1) is equivalent or less than R
With equality only when I = 1. In autarky, each consumer will
select the consumption profile that maximizes his ex-ante utility u
under the constrains C1 and C2
Hye-jin CHO Bank Capital Regulation (BCR) Model
1.Motivation
2.Literature
3.Risks recognized in the General Equilibrium
4. General Equilibrium
How we can induce the moral hazard problem?
Market Economy - With trade
If agents are allowed to trade, welfare improves. By investing I at
t = 0, an agent can now obtain
C1 = 1− I + pRI
If she needs to consume early (in which case she will sell RI
bonds). If, on the contrary, she needs to consume late, she will
obtain C2 =
p
1− I + RI =
p
1
(1− I + pRI )
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Market Economy - With trade
Since she can then buy
1− I
p
bonds at t = 1
I can be freely chosen by agents, the only possible equilibrium price
is p =
1
R
.
Otherwise either an excess supply or an excess demand of bonds
will occur (I = +∞) if p > 1R
The equilibrium allocation of the market economy is therefore
C M1 = 1, C
M
2 = R and the corresponding investment level is
I M = Π2.
Notice that this market allocation Pareto dominates the autarky
allocation. Since there is no liquidation. In addition, it is not
ex-ante Pareto optimal.
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Optimal allocation
max Π1u(C1) + ρΠ2u(C2)
Π1C1 + Π2
C2
R
= 1
L=Π1u(C1) + ρΠ2u(C2)− λ(1− Π1C1 + Π2 C2
R
)
∂L
∂C1
= 0
∂L
∂C2
= 0
Π1u
′(C1) + λ[Pi1C1] = 0
ρΠ2u
′(C2) + λ[
Pi2
C1
] = 0
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Optimal allocation
This optimal allocation satisfies in particular the first-order
condition: u’(C ∗1 )= ρRu’C
∗
2
Therefore, except in the very peculiar case in which u’(1)=ρRu’(R),
The market allocation (C M1 =1, C
M
2 =R ) is not Pareto optimal. In
particular, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume that C −→ Cu’(C)
is decreasing. In that case, since R>1, ρRu′(R) < ρu′(1) < u′(1),
and the market allocation can be Pareto improved by increasing
C M1 and decreasing C
M
2 : C
M
1 = 1 < C
∗
1 ; C
M
2 = R > C
∗
2 The
market economy does not provide perfect insurance against
liquidity shocks, and therefore does not lead to an efficient
allocation of resources.
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Financial Intermediation (”FI” as below)
Provided the possibility of strategic behavior of depositors is ruled
out, the Pareto optimal allocation (C ∗1 , C
∗
2 ) can be implemented
very easily by a financial intermediary who offers a demand deposit
contract stipulated as follows:
In exchange for a deposit of one unit at t = 0, individuals can get
either C ∗1 at t = 1 or C
∗
2 at t = 2. In order to fulfill its obligation,
the FI stores Π1C
∗
1 and invests the rest in the illiquid techonology.
Thus we have established the following:
(result) In an economy in which agents are individually subject to
independent liquidity shocks, the market allocation can be
improved by a deposit contract offered by a financial intermediary.
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Financial Intermediation (”FI” as below)
The reason why the market allocation is not Pareto optimal is that
complete contingent markets cannot exist: the state of economy
(i.e., the complete list of the consumers who need to consume
early) is not observable by anyone. The only (noncontingent)
financial market that can be opened (namely the bond market) is
not sufficient to obtain efficient risk sharing.
(point) Notice that a crucial assumption is that no individual
withdraw at t = 1 if he or she does not have to. Provided ρR > 1,
this assumption is not unreasonable, since it corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium behavior. The first-order condition of the optimal
allocation implies ( since ρR ≥ 1 ) that C ∗1 < C ∗2 :
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Financial Intermediation (”FI” as below)
in other words, a deviation by a single late consumer (withdraw at
t = 1 and store the good until t = 2) is never in that consumer’s
own interest.
Also, another Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium exists in which
deviations of all late consumers occur simultaneously.
(point) In this simple setup, an FI cannot coexist with a financial
market. Indeed if there is a bond market at t = 1, the equilibrium
price is necessarily p=
1
R
. then the optimal allocation (C ∗1 , C
∗
2 ) is
not a Nash equilibrium anymore:
RC ∗1 > R > C
∗
2
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The Moral Hazard Issue
Assets (t = 0) Liabilities (t = 0)
Loans L Deposits D
Insurance premium P Equity F
Assets (t = 1) Liabilities (t = 1)
Loan Repayments L˜ Deposits D
Insurance Payment S˜ Liquidation Value V˜
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The Moral Hazard Issue
At date 1, the stockholders receive the liquidation value of the
bank:
V˜ = BankAsset − Deposits + RecoveredDeposits = L˜− D + S˜
The expected profit for the bank’s stockholders will be
pi := E (V˜ − F = (θX − L) + ((1− θ)D − P),
If deposit insurance is fairly priced, this term is nil (P = (1− θ)D),
and the strong form of the Modigliani-Miller result obtains: the
market value of firm, E (V˜ ) + D, is independent of its liability
structure.
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The Moral Hazard Issue
The moral hazard problem is easily captured from this formula.
Suppose that P is fixed and that banks are free to determine the
characteristic (θ, X) of the projects they finance in a given feasible
set. Then, within a class of projects with the same NPV (θX-L =
constant),the banks will choose those with the lowest probability of
success θ (or the highest risk). This comes from the fact that the
premium rate
P
D
is given, and does not depend on the risk taken
by the bank.
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The portfolio composition effected by the minimum equity
capital regulation
In the model of Kahane (1977), the minimum capital requirement
causes an unintended result: it worsened, rather than improved the
intermediary’s condition and increases its probability of ruin. He
check this calculation with the ruin constraint and given standard
deviation of rate of return at the portfolio composition of liability,
stock and bonds.
In this paper, with the portfolio of risky portfolio and stable
portfolio, explanation will be easier to be understood why minimum
equity regulation induces for banks to operate riskier portfolio.
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The portfolio composition effected by the minimum equity
capital regulation
If we assume that the bank manages a risky portfolio with an
expected rate of return of 17% and a standard deviation of 27%.
The expected rate of return on equity is 7%. and even though,
there is pressure to raise the required equity every period, liability
is same every period. The bank try to meet the bank capital
condition regulated by the financial intermediaries, the bank should
operate much more riskier portfolio comparing to the previous
period as following.
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The portfolio composition effected by the minimum equity
capital regulation
Effects of increasing the equity at the portfolio composition
Period Required Equity, Liability Portfolio composition
(risky portfolio, stable portfolio)
1 12 (12%), 88(88%) (-61.6%, 161.6%)
2 13 (13%), 88(87.12%) (-61 %, 161 %)
3 14 (14%), 88(86.72%) (-60.4 %, 160.4 %)
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The portfolio composition effected by the minimum equity
capital regulation
Thus, in order to obtain a mean return of 0.84%, 0.90%, 0.96%,
the bank must invest -61.6%, -61%, -60.4 of total funds in the
risky portfolio and 161.6%, 161%, 160.4% in stable portfolio.
Standard deviation which implies the probability to get mean
return, is also increasing.
Standard Deviation
0.12× 0.27 = 0.0324
0.13× 0.27 = 0.0351
0.14× 0.27 = 0.0378
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Deposit affects optimized equity capital
n Deposits Borrowings OptimizedEquityCapital
n = 0 D0 = 1 - -
n = 1 D1 = (1− β − K) B1 = (1− β) OEC1 = K
n = 2 D2 = (1− β − K)2 B2 = (1− β)(1− β − K) OEC2 = K(1− β − K)
n = 3 D3 = (1− β − K)3 B3 = (1− β)(1− β − K)2 OEC3 = K(1− β − K)2
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
n = k Dk = (1− β − K)k Bk = (1− β)(1− β − K)k−1 OECk = K(1− β − K)k−1
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
n →∞ D∞ = 0 B∞ = 0 OEC∞ = 0
total deposits total borrowings total optimized equity capital
D =
1
K + β
B =
1− β
K + β
OEC =
K
K + β
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Deposit affects optimized equity capital
[β = restriction of borrowing] Then, Borrowings can be executed
between Deposit 1 and Restriction β
[balance sheet equality constraint] Dn = Bn − OECn
Hart and Jaffee(1974) analyzed the properties of the feasible and
efficient set with the assumption that the initial equity capital is
zero (i.e. K=0) in the substantial degrees of leverage. In the
paper, following the KAHANE (1977), we assume the equity is
positive (K > 0) so that the opportunity set does not pass through
the origin (i.e. the vector of Deposit D, Borrowing B, Optimized
Equity Capital = 0 give an infeasible solution).
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Deposit affects optimized equity capital
Then the theoretical superior limit for deposits is defined by the
following:
Deposits=
∑∞
n=0[(1− K− β)] =
1
K + β
Theoretically, superior limit for the equity capital by the firm is
defined by the following:
OptimizedEquityCapital = K× Deposits = K
K + β
and the theoretical superior limit for total borrowings in banks is
defined by the following:
Borrowings = (1− β)× Deposits = 1− β
K + β
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Deposit affects optimized equity capital
Borrowings at stage k are a function of the deposits at the
precedent stage: Bk = (1− β − K)× Dk−1
Optimized Equity Capital at stage k is a function of the deposits
at the precedent stage: OECk = K× Dk−1
Hence, if the optimized equity capital depends on the initial
deposit and assume the terminal condition of bank is liquidation of
bank deposits,
(result) Hence, Optimized Equity Capital depends on the previous
deposit. In addition, deposit insurance cost also increases because
deposit insurance depends on the number of household.
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k index for the indicator of risk taking
Define the equity capital ratio with respect to total liabilities and
equity capital,
EquityCapital
Dh + Bfr − Lfr , K ∈ (0, 1), the borrowing (from the
federal banks) ratio
Bfr − Lfr
Dh + Bfr − Lfr , β ∈ (0, 1); suppose the
demand for funds is unlimited;
By summing up two quantities, the theoretical equity capital
multiplier is defined as
k =
Deposits + OptimizedEquityCapital
Borrowings + OptimizedEquityCapital
=
1 + K
K + β
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k index for the indicator of risk taking
k is the index to decline to increase the risk at the portfolio of
commercial banks. The deposit is fixed at total 1 and borrowings
have the constraint can not be negative value beyond the
minimum borrowings β. For example, if deposit=1, the minimum
of required equity = 10%, borrowings = 0.3
1 + 0.1
0.3 + 0.1
=
1.1
0.4
= 2.75
If the minimum of required equity is raised from 10%, to 15%, k
index was downed as below.
1 + 0.15
0.3 + 0.15
=
1.15
0.45
= 2.55
To increase the k index, the bank should increase the deposit
beyond the initial deposit level (1 in this simulation) or allocate the
borrowing portfolio.
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Conclusion
(Conclusion) The combination of portfolio composition test,
deposit-equity optimization and k index enables bounding the
bank capital regulation problems.
The minimum capital requirement is a necessary condition for
banking sector stability to raise the quality, consistency and
transparency of the capital base. However, it has friction with the
portfolio management. By using effects of increasing the equity
at the portfolio composition, reducing procyclicality (to the
financial shocks) and promoting the countercyclical buffer are
pursued.
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Conclusion
In the Basel 3 system, The risk coverage framework intends to
capture all material risks by using counterparty credit risk
formula weighted on the external rating of the counter party.
Exposure measures contain on-balance sheet, repurchase
agreements and securities finance, derivatives and off-balance sheet
(OBS) items. In the paper, rather than enlarging the risk
contagion, related factors and risk affection scope are detected
without overstatement by using the general equilibrium model and
deposit affection to the optimized equity capital.
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Conclusion
Basel 3 introduced a minimum leverage ratio. the leverage ratio
was calculated by dividing Tier1 capital by the bank’s average
total consolidated assets. In the paper, k index is suggested as
the indicator of risk taking. Within the liability, three major
fractions like deposits, borrowings and optimized equity capital are
considered as the complementary of minimum capital requirement.
Assets of commercial banks are mainly consisted with loans and
securities. Because the optimized equity capital grows and deposits
is restricted by change, borrowings which is the difference between
asset and deposit+equity capital should be checked whether
borrowings can cover the optimized equity by k index.
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